Board composition, ownership structure and firm performance: New Indian evidence

被引:7
作者
Ganguli, Santanu K. [1 ]
Guha Deb, Soumya [2 ]
机构
[1] Jaipuria Inst Management, Near Shipra Naka, Indore 453771, India
[2] Indian Inst Management Sambalpur, Sambalpur 768019, Odisha, India
关键词
Ownership concentration; Board size; Independent directors; Tobin's Q; Return on assets;
D O I
10.1057/s41310-021-00113-5
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This paper studies the impact of board composition and ownership structure on accounting as well as market performance of Indian firms in presence of certain unique statutory provisions relating to independent directors and limits on ownership concentration. The study uses a sample of 265 non-finance, non-banking and non-PSU Indian companies of S&P 500 index and applies OLS models initially. Having identified evidence of a possible feedback loop, the study then employs instrumental variables and 2 SLS models to explore how firm performance is impacted by ownership concentration and board composition after controlling for firm-level and industry-level characteristics. A series of robustness tests are used to substantiate the findings from the main analysis. A two-way relationship and 'nonlinearity' are recorded between market performance and ownership concentration. The study shows that a moderate-to-high ownership concentration between 25 and 75%enhances firm performance and very low level of concentration adversely impacts the same. Performance is positively impacted by board size but not by board independence. The findings of the study become particularly important for legislators and investors in the backdrop of SEBI's regulations fixing a maximum limit on promoter's shareholding and existence of a minimum external directors in the board for listed Indian companies that might have an implication on firm performance from liquidity, agency and information asymmetry perspective. The study documents that an optimal shareholding concentration and large board size with internal directors rather than a high percentage of independent external directors leads to value creation in Indian context. The paper provides new insights onto the relationship between board composition, ownership structure and firm performance in the backdrop of regulations brought out by SEBI in this behalf. The findings of the study have varying degree of application in common law origin countries with strong regulatory framework for investors' protection.
引用
收藏
页码:256 / 268
页数:13
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