Corporate governance of pension plans: The UK evidence

被引:51
作者
Cocco, Joao F. [1 ]
Volpin, Paolo F.
机构
[1] London Business Sch, London NW1 4SA, England
[2] Ctr Econ Policy Res, London SW1Y 6LA, England
关键词
INVESTMENT; REVERSIONS; TAKEOVERS; FINANCE;
D O I
10.2469/faj.v63.n1.4409
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
For this study of the governance of defined-benefit pension plans in the United Kingdom, the governance measure was equal to the proportion of trustees of the pension plan in 2002 who were also executive directors of the sponsoring company. The findings indicate that pension plans of indebted companies with a higher proportion of insider than independent trustees invest a higher proportion of pension plan assets in equities and that the sponsors contribute less to the plan and have a larger dividend payout ratio. This evidence supports the agency view that insider trustees act in the interests of shareholders of the sponsor, not necessarily in the interests of pension plan members.
引用
收藏
页码:70 / 83
页数:14
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