Time horizon and equilibrium selection in tacit coordination games: Experimental results

被引:50
作者
Berninghaus, SK [1 ]
Ehrhart, KM [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Karlsruhe, Inst Stat & Math Econ, D-76128 Karlsruhe, Germany
关键词
coordination games; repeated games; experimental economics;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00086-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We analyze the impact of the number of repetitions of a simple coordination game on equilibrium selection. Results of computerized coordination experiments with varying number of iterations show that the Pareto dominant equilibrium is selected already after a few periods when the number of iterations is sufficiently large. Our results can be partly explained by a particular version of the 'learning direction theory'. Furthermore, we present a new framework for experimental design in real time. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:231 / 248
页数:18
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