Extending Tournament Solutions

被引:0
|
作者
Brandt, Felix [1 ]
Brill, Markus [2 ]
Harrenstein, Paul [3 ]
机构
[1] Tech Univ Munich, Inst Informat, D-85748 Garching, Germany
[2] Duke Univ, Dept Comp Sci, Durham, NC 27708 USA
[3] Univ Oxford, Dept Comp Sci, Oxford OX1 3QD, England
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE | 2014年
关键词
CHOICE; COMPLEXITY;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
An important subclass of social choice functions, so-called majoritarian (or C1) functions, only take into account the pairwise majority relation between alternatives. In the absence of majority ties-e.g., when there is an odd number of agents with linear preferences-the majority relation is anti-symmetric and complete and can thus conveniently be represented by a tournament. Tournaments have a rich mathematical theory and many formal results for majoritarian functions assume that the majority relation constitutes a tournament. Moreover, most majoritarian functions have only been defined for tournaments and allow for a variety of generalizations to unrestricted preference profiles, none of which can be seen as the unequivocal extension of the original function. In this paper, we argue that restricting attention to tournaments is justified by the existence of a conservative extension, which inherits most of the commonly considered properties from its underlying tournament solution.
引用
收藏
页码:580 / 586
页数:7
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