With a Little Help from My Enemy: Comparative Advertising as a Signal of Quality

被引：21

作者：

Barigozzi, Francesca ^{[1
]}

Garella, Paolo G. ^{[2
]}

Peitz, Martin ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Dipartimento Sci Econ, I-40126 Bologna, Italy

[2] Dipartimento Sci Econ, Milan, Italy

[3] Univ Mannheim, Dept Econ, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 2009年 / 18卷 / 04期

关键词：

PRODUCT QUALITY; PRICE; EQUILIBRIA; ENTRY;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00238.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal using a model where an entrant can choose to advertise by comparing its product to that of an established incumbent. Comparative advertising, comparing quality of one's own product to that of a rival's, empowers the latter to file for court intervention if it believes the comparison to be false or misleading. We show that comparative advertising can be a signal in instances where generic advertising is not viable.

引用

页码：1071 / 1094

页数：24

共 29 条

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Aluf Yana., 2001, COMP ADVERTISING COM

[2]

Anderson S. P., 2006, COMP ADVERTISING

[3] Advertising content [J].