With a Little Help from My Enemy: Comparative Advertising as a Signal of Quality

被引：21
作者：
Barigozzi, Francesca [1 ]
Garella, Paolo G. [2 ]
Peitz, Martin [3 ]
机构：
[1] Dipartimento Sci Econ, I-40126 Bologna, Italy
[2] Dipartimento Sci Econ, Milan, Italy
[3] Univ Mannheim, Dept Econ, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 2009年 / 18卷 / 04期
关键词：
PRODUCT QUALITY; PRICE; EQUILIBRIA; ENTRY;
D O I：
10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00238.x
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal using a model where an entrant can choose to advertise by comparing its product to that of an established incumbent. Comparative advertising, comparing quality of one's own product to that of a rival's, empowers the latter to file for court intervention if it believes the comparison to be false or misleading. We show that comparative advertising can be a signal in instances where generic advertising is not viable.
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页码：1071 / 1094
页数：24
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