BEING THE CEO'S BOSS: AN EXAMINATION OF BOARD CHAIR ORIENTATIONS

被引:82
作者
Krause, Ryan [1 ]
机构
[1] Texas Christian Univ, Neeley Sch Business, Dept Management Entrepreneurship & Leadership, Ft Worth, TX 76129 USA
关键词
board chair orientations; board leadership; control; collaboration; content analysis; FIRM FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE; LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE; AGENCY THEORY; DUALITY; MANAGEMENT; DIRECTORS; INDEPENDENCE; POWER; COMPENSATION;
D O I
10.1002/smj.2500
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Research summary: Scholars have traditionally conceptualized board leadership as a dichotomous construct. A combined CEO and board chair position is interpreted as reflecting a more collaborative approach to corporate governance, whereas separate positions are interpreted as ensuring greater board control. I challenge this conceptualization and posit that a separate board chair can be oriented toward collaboration as well as-or in place of-control. I analyze newly available data from corporate proxy statements to identify these two board chair orientations and test competing perspectives on how they impact profitability growth in a sample of S&P 500 firms. The results indicate that board leadership is a more nuanced phenomenon than the extant literature would suggest. Managerial summary: What is the role of the board chair when not the CEO? Corporate governance experts assert the board chair's role is to monitor and control the CEO. Yet, board chairs often play another, more collaborative role. Board chairs frequently provide advice and guidance to CEOs and relieve CEOs of board leadership burdens, enabling the CEOs to focus on their primary responsibilities. In this study, I examine the effect of board chair orientations on financial performance and find that, as with separating or joining the CEO and board chair positions, the profitability implications of the selected orientation are far from universal. Board chairs must consider their firm's performance context in order to get the most out of a particular approach to being the CEO's boss. Copyright (C) 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:697 / 713
页数:17
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