Mediators in position auctions

被引:19
作者
Ashlagi, Itai [2 ]
Monderer, Dov [1 ]
Tennenholtz, Moshe [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Technion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel
[2] Harvard Univ, Harvard Business Sch, Boston, MA 02163 USA
[3] Microsoft Israel R&D Ctr, IL-46725 Herzliyya, Israel
基金
以色列科学基金会;
关键词
Mediator; Position auction; Implementation; K-PRICE AUCTIONS; COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; COMMUNICATION; EQUILIBRIUM;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A mediator is a reliable entity which plays on behalf of the players who give her the right to play. The mediator acts in a pre-specified way based on messages received from the players. However, a mediator cannot enforce behavior; that is, players call play in the game directly without the mediator's help. A mediator generates a new game for the players, the mediated game. The outcome in the original game of an equilibrium in the mediated game is called a mediated equilibrium. Monderer and Tennenholtz introduced a theory of mediators for games with complete information. We extend the theory of mediators to games with incomplete information, and apply the new theory to position auctions, a central topic in electronic commerce. We provide a minimal set of conditions on position auctions, which is sufficient to guarantee that the VCG outcome function is a mediated equilibrium in these auctions. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:2 / 21
页数:20
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