COMPENSATION LEVELS OF EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL IN SPAIN: INFLUENCE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND OF CONCENTRATION OF SHAREHOLDINGS

This work aims to contribute to the field of research on Agency Theory, based on an approach that is different from the previous literature. It focuses on analysis of characteristics of the structure of the Board of Directors as mechanisms for control over the level of remuneration awarded to executive personnel, both in the context of "concentrated" as well as "dispersed" share ownership, with the aim of determining whether or not the postulates of this theory are applicable to both. To achieve this objective, the study is based on a sample of 80 traded Spanish companies for the period 2004-2007, to which crosscutting and panel data models are applied. The results obtained show that the characteristics that define the structure of the Board of Directors constitute efficient mechanisms for supervision and control of compensation received by Top Management, although its influence in this regard is conditioned by the concentration of ownership.