Quality-Speed Conundrum: Trade-offs in Customer-Intensive Services

被引:162
作者
Anand, Krishnan S. [1 ]
Pac, M. Fazil [2 ]
Veeraraghavan, Senthil [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Utah, David Eccles Sch Business, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA
[2] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
strategic customers; queueing games; service operations; cost disease; PRIMARY-CARE; HEALTH-CARE; TIME; COMPETITION; SYSTEMS; QUEUES;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.1100.1250
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
In many services, the quality or value provided by the service increases with the time the service provider spends with the customer. However, longer service times also result in longer waits for customers. We term such services, in which the interaction between quality and speed is critical, as customer-intensive services. In a queueing framework, we parameterize the degree of customer intensity of the service. The service speed chosen by the service provider affects the quality of the service through its customer intensity. Customers queue for the service based on service quality, delay costs, and price. We study how a service provider facing such customers makes the optimal "quality-speed trade-off." Our results demonstrate that the customer intensity of the service is a critical driver of equilibrium price, service speed, demand, congestion in queues, and service provider revenues. Customer intensity leads to outcomes very different from those of traditional models of service rate competition. For instance, as the number of competing servers increases, the price increases, and the servers become slower.
引用
收藏
页码:40 / 56
页数:17
相关论文
共 44 条
[1]  
Afeche P., 2006, Incentive-compatible Revenue Management in Queueing systems: Optimal Strategic delay and other Delay Tactics
[2]   Competition in service industries [J].
Allon, Gad ;
Federgruen, Awi .
OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 2007, 55 (01) :37-55
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2008, NATL HLTH STAT REPOR
[4]   Price and delay competition between two service providers [J].
Armony, M ;
Haviv, M .
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2003, 147 (01) :32-50
[5]   HEALTH-CARE, EDUCATION AND THE COST DISEASE - A LOOMING CRISIS FOR PUBLIC CHOICE [J].
BAUMOL, WJ .
PUBLIC CHOICE, 1993, 77 (01) :17-28
[6]   QUEUING MODELS FOR OUTPATIENT APPOINTMENT SYSTEMS - A CASE-STUDY [J].
BRAHIMI, M ;
WORTHINGTON, DJ .
JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONAL RESEARCH SOCIETY, 1991, 42 (09) :733-746
[7]   Competition and outsourcing with scale economies [J].
Cachon, GP ;
Harker, PT .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2002, 48 (10) :1314-1333
[8]   THE CUSTOMER CONTACT MODEL FOR ORGANIZATION DESIGN [J].
CHASE, RB ;
TANSIK, DA .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1983, 29 (09) :1037-1050
[9]   Monopoly pricing when customers queue [J].
Chen, H ;
Frank, M .
IIE TRANSACTIONS, 2004, 36 (06) :569-581
[10]  
CHEN H, 2003, IIE T, V35, P871