机构:
Mitre Corp, Mclean, VA 22102 USAMitre Corp, Mclean, VA 22102 USA
Hegarty, Christopher
[1
]
Odeh, Ali
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Mitre Corp, Mclean, VA 22102 USAMitre Corp, Mclean, VA 22102 USA
Odeh, Ali
[1
]
Shallberg, Karl
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Zeta Associates, Fairfax, VA USAMitre Corp, Mclean, VA 22102 USA
Shallberg, Karl
[2
]
Wesson, Kyle
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Zeta Associates, Fairfax, VA USAMitre Corp, Mclean, VA 22102 USA
Wesson, Kyle
[2
]
Walter, Todd
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Stanford Univ, Dept Aeronaut & Astronaut, GPS Res Lab, Stanford, CA 94305 USAMitre Corp, Mclean, VA 22102 USA
Walter, Todd
[3
]
Alexander, Ken
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
FAA, Washington, DC USAMitre Corp, Mclean, VA 22102 USA
Alexander, Ken
[4
]
机构:
[1] Mitre Corp, Mclean, VA 22102 USA
[2] Zeta Associates, Fairfax, VA USA
[3] Stanford Univ, Dept Aeronaut & Astronaut, GPS Res Lab, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[4] FAA, Washington, DC USA
来源:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 31ST INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL MEETING OF THE SATELLITE DIVISION OF THE INSTITUTE OF NAVIGATION (ION GNSS+ 2018)
|
2018年
关键词:
D O I:
10.33012/2018.16008
中图分类号:
TP7 [遥感技术];
学科分类号:
081102 ;
0816 ;
081602 ;
083002 ;
1404 ;
摘要:
Standards for the next-generation of civilian airborne GNSS equipment are now in development by RTCA and the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE). An initial version (for verification and validation) of Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for dual-frequency multi-constellation (DFMC) GNSS airborne equipment is planned to be completed by 2020 and a final version by 2022. One objective for the next-generation airborne equipment is for improved resiliency in the presence of GNSS threats including spoofing. The current direction within RTCA and EUROCAE is for the threat of spoofing to be addressed primarily through the introduction of new requirements to detect the presence of false GNSS signals within the airborne equipment so that so that an alternative means of navigation can be employed without a significant reduction in safety. This paper postulates a set of minimum high-level spoofing detection requirements for airborne GNSS equipment and assesses various methods against these requirements. One objective of this paper is to identify a number of issues for spoofing detection that are unique to certified airborne equipment for the purpose of fostering research to address these issues.