CEO pay disparity: Efficient contracting or managerial power?

被引：32
作者：
Thi Thanh Nha Vo [1 ]
Canil, Jean Milva [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Adelaide, Sch Accounting & Finance, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia
来源：
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2019年 / 54卷
关键词：
Compensation; Options; Incentive; CEO power; Efficiency; FASB ASC 718; STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION; RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION; INCENTIVES; INVESTMENT; DIRECTORS; FIRMS; DETERMINANTS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.10.002
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This paper investigates whether CEO pay disparity reflects efficient contracting or managerial power by exploiting a quasi-natural experiment which mandated option expensing, FASB ASC 718. We find supportive evidence for the managerial power hypothesis. Relative to low pay disparity firms, firms characterized by high pay disparity exhibit a significantly larger decline in options pre- versus post-expensing. Further, high pay disparity firms are found to replenish their compensation with cash-based rather than other equity-based pay. Our findings suggest CEOs in high pay disparity firms exploited the free accounting cost of options to inflate their pay rather than for their incentive properties. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：168 / 190
页数：23
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