Kant, race, and natural history

This article presents a new argument concerning the relation between Kant's theory of race and aspects of the critical philosophy. It argues that Kant's treatment of the problem of the systematic unity of nature and knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgment can be traced back a methodological problem in the natural history of the period - that of the possibility of a natural system of nature. Kant's transformation of the methodological problem from natural history into a set of philosophical (and specifically epistemological) problems proceeds by way of the working out of his own problem in natural history - the problem of the natural history of the human races - and specifically the problem of the unity in diversity of the human species, in response to which he develops a theory of race. This theory of race is, further, the first developed model of the use of teleological judgment in Kant's work. The article thus argues that Kant's philosophical position on the systematic unity of nature and of knowledge in the first and third Critiques, and his account and defense of teleological judgment, are developed out of problems first articulated in his solution to the problem of the unity in diversity of the human species - that is, in his theory of race. The article does not seek to establish that these aspects of the critical philosophy are therefore racialised. But it does demonstrate, against those who deny its salience to his philosophy, how the problem of the unity in diversity of the human species and Kant's theory of race is significant for the development of aspects of the critical philosophy and thus contributes to their philosophical problematics.