THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS AND THE KANTIAN INTERPRETATION OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM

According to the familiar interpretation, A Theory of Justice (TJ) develops a strong Kantianism. Rawls himself understand his own theory in Kantian terms, and basic components of TJ, such as the original position and reflective equilibrium, have been understood as relying on Kantian practical reason. Meanwhile, the consensus concerning Political Liberalism (PL) is that this book is less Kantian. Even, for some, the later book is not Kantian at all. Rainer Forst argues against the later claim, developing a Kantian reading of PL. In this interpretation, the key concept in the development of Rawls's view is a Kantian notion of practical reason. This component is essential in Rawls, and not only concepts such as the original position and reflective equilibrium have to be understood from this foundation, but also others such as the overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines. This article maintains that PL is less Kantian than Forst argues, and that is better to understand this theory as postkantian. I examine in positive terms this feature of PL, arguing that Rawls is a sui generis thinker. This shows among other things his substantive contribution to the development of political philosophy.