CEO DUALITY AND STOCK PRICE CRASH RISK: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

被引：0

作者：

Chen, Xiding ^{[1
]}

Ye, Zhiqiang ^{[2
]}

Zhou, Zhibo ^{[3
]}

Zhang, Fangfang ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Wenzhou Business Coll, Dept Finance, Wenzhou 325035, Peoples R China

[2] East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

[3] Southwest Univ, Coll Econ & Management, Chongqing 400715, Peoples R China

[4] Wenzhou Business Coll, Dept Accounting, Wenzhou 325035, Peoples R China

来源：

TRANSFORMATIONS IN BUSINESS & ECONOMICS | 2017年 / 16卷 / 2B期

关键词：

CEO duality; crash risk; information asymmetry; Agency theory; China; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM; BOARD; COMPENSATION; PERFORMANCE; EQUITY;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

CEO duality motivates executives to boost financial performance and withhold unfavourable news, which increases future stock price crashes. Using China's listed firms from 2004 to 2014 as the sample, we present evidence CEO duality exerts positive effects on stock price crash risk. Moreover, the positive effect of CEO duality on crash risk is strengthened when the firms have relatively higher R&D expenditure, lower market competition, and lower analyst coverage.

引用

页码：728 / 741

页数：14

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