Study on the matching relationship between entrepreneurial talent and control rights of venture firm financed by venture capital

被引：0

作者：

Li, Yunhe ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Shanghai 200030, Peoples R China

来源：

PROCEEDING OF CHINA PRIVATE ECONOMY INNOVATION INTERNATIONAL FORUM | 2007年

关键词：

entrepreneurship; venture capital; corporate government;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

The control rights of a venture firm and its residual right are not necessary equally matched, that is because the control rights of a venture firm is required to match with entrepreneurial talent, however, the two different types of matching are unusually overlapped. Enlightened by un-differential curve theory, this paper builds a model of equally efficient firm value curve by exploring venture capitalist variable and entrepreneur variable, and then, analyzes the matching relationship between control rights of a venture firm and entrepreneurial talent.

引用

页码：306 / 311

页数：6

共 13 条

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