Success, truth and the Galilean Strategy

被引：5

作者：

Magnus, PD ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Philosophy, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA

来源：

BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE | 2003年 / 54卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1093/bjps/54.3.465

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

Philip Kitcher develops the Galilean Strategy to defend realism against its many opponents. I explore the structure of the Galilean Strategy and consider it specifically as an instrument against constructive empiricism. Kitcher claims that the Galilean Strategy underwrites an inference from success to truth. We should resist that conclusion, I argue, but the Galilean Strategy should lead us by other routes to believe in many things about which the empiricist would rather remain agnostic. 1 Target: empiricism 2 The Galilean Strategy 3 Strengthening the argument 4 Success and truth 5 Conclusion.

引用

页码：465 / 474

页数：10

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[No title captured]

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