THE CONSEQUENCES OF DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES FOR THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IN THE GLOBAL MARKET

被引:0
作者
Lyakin, Alexander N. [1 ]
Rogov, Mikhail I. [2 ]
机构
[1] St Petersburg Univ, Fac Econ, Dept Econ & Econ Policy, Tchaikovskogo Str 62,Off 310, St Petersburg 191194, Russia
[2] St Petersburg Univ, Grad Sch Management, Dept Operat Management, Volkhovskiy Pereulok 3, St Petersburg 199004, Russia
来源
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, PTS I - VI | 2017年
关键词
global economy; embargo; boycott; efficiency of protectionist policy;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper considers trade and finance flow limitation measures of countries that are involved in the global economy. Authors clarify the terminology, particularly, they argue that discriminatory measures against Russia as well as Russian responding measures can't be called sanctions. Only supranational unions, which have particular authority to implement sanctions toward its members, can use this instrument. Embargo and boycott are regarded as extreme forms of competitive struggle between national economies. The efficiency of limitation measures on goods and capital movement is estimated by matching benefits and losses from these measures for the national economy, not by matching the losses of contractors. In the short run boycott is more effective than embargo, because it leads to the growth of industries that are protected by the trade barrier. The embargo, in turn, is less effective, due to the variety of trade links in the global economy. The analysis of Russian protectionist trade measures for agricultural industry shows that there was rapid sectoral growth of domestic production and displace of agricultural import with short-term recoupment. In capital-intensive sectors, there has been a change in sales geography. It is expected that in the long run boycott will lead to loss in effectiveness and competitiveness, and embargo will restrain economic growth by preventing effective industry development.
引用
收藏
页码:1380 / 1387
页数:8
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