Does it help firms to secretly pay for stock promoters?

被引：4

作者：

Massoud, Nadia ^{[1
]}

Ullah, Saif ^{[2
]}

Scholnick, Barry ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Melbourne, Melbourne Business Sch, 200 Leicester St, Melbourne, Vic 3053, Australia

[2] Concordia Univ, John Molson Sch Business, 1450 Guy St, Montreal, PQ H3H 0A1, Canada

[3] Univ Alberta, Sch Business, Edmonton, AB T6G 2R6, Canada

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY | 2016年 / 26卷

关键词：

Promoters; Paid analysis; Pump and dump; DISCRETIONARY DISCLOSURE; INVESTOR RELATIONS; RETURNS; INCENTIVES; LIQUIDITY; QUALITY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfs.2016.08.002

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine deals between listed firms and promoters who have been secretly hired to increase their stock prices. This behavior by the secret promoter is illegal (and leads to prosecution) but the actions of the hiring firm are legal. We use data from these prosecutions to analyze the behavior and motivations of the hiring firms. We find that secret promotion leads to an initial increase in the price and trading volume of the firms on the date that the secret promotion started. Subsequently, however, we find that this increase in price is reversed when regulators (e.g. SEC or NASD) take action against these promoters for not disclosing their relationships with the hiring firms. We find that the main motives behind these relationships are to maximize the private benefits of the firm's managers and owners through pumping the share prices and subsequently dumping their shareholdings. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：45 / 61

页数：17

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