The slow process: A hypothetical cognitive adaptation for distributed cognitive networks

Human cognitive evolution is characterized by two special features that are truly novel in the primate line. The first is the emergence of "mindsharing" cultures that perform cooperative cognitive work, and serve as distributed cognitive networks. The second is the emergence of a brain that is specifically adapted for functioning within those distributed networks, and cannot realize its design potential without them. This paper proposes a hypothetical neural process at the core of this brain adaptation, called the "slow process". It enables the human brain to comprehend social events of much longer duration and complexity than those that characterize primate social life. It runs in the background of human cognitive life, with the faster moving sensorimotor interface running in the foreground. Most mammals can integrate events in the shorter time zone that corresponds to working memory. However, very few can comprehend complex events that extend over several hours (for example, a game or conversation) in what may be called the "intermediate" time zone. Adult humans typically live, plan, and imagine their lives in this time range, which seems to exceed the capabilities of our closest relatives, bonobos and chimpanzees. In summary, human cognition has both an individual and a collective dimension. Individual brains and minds function within cognitive-cultural networks, or CCNs, that store and transmit knowledge. The human brain relies on cultural input even to develop the basic cognitive capacities needed to gain access to that knowledge in the first place. The postulated slow process is a top-down executive capacity that evolved specifically to manage the cultural connection, and handle the cognitive demands imposed by increasingly complex distributed systems. (C) 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.