Consolidation and distribution of quota holdings in the Icelandic fisheries

被引:44
作者
Agnarsson, S. [1 ]
Matthiasson, T. [2 ]
Giry, F. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Iceland, Sch Business, IS-101 Reykjavik, Iceland
[2] Univ Iceland, Fac Econ, IS-101 Reykjavik, Iceland
关键词
Icelandic fisheries; Fisheries management systems; ITQs; Consolidation of harvesting rights; Concentration ratio; Herfindahl-Hirschman index; Lorenz curves; Gini coefficients; INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; NEW-ZEALAND; EXPERIENCE; MANAGEMENT; EFFICIENCY;
D O I
10.1016/j.marpol.2016.04.037
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
The aim of this work is to measure the development of the concentration of quota holdings by harvesting companies and harbours in Iceland. For the period 1990-2014, the analysis traces the development of relative quota holdings of the biggest actors operating large vessels as well as firms that employ smaller boats that are only allowed to use hook-and-line. A more detailed data set is used for the period 20012014 which allows for a more thorough investigation of consolidation in both fleet segments using Herfindahl-Hirchman Indexes, Gini coefficients and Lorenz-curves. The biggest firms in the two fleet segments increased their share of quotas throughout the period but the quota market is though still quite competitive. The distribution of quotas between firms has become more unequal, and there is also clear evidence of increasing transfers between harbours, especially in the case of the quota shares of hook and -line boats. However, the results also indicate that spatial concentration has been much less than consolidation at firm level during the period under consideration. This would indicate that firms have mostly grown in size by merging with local firms or buying out smaller local operators. (C) 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:263 / 270
页数:8
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