Tax Revenue Manipulation by Local Taxation Administrations in China

被引：9

作者：

Deng, Yi-Hong ^{[1
]}

Luo, Ting ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Tsinghua Univ, Dept Accounting, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China

来源：

ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 18卷 / 01期

关键词：

Taxation administration; tax revenue manipulation; effective tax rate; volatility; FIRM SIZE; RATES;

D O I：

10.1080/16081625.2011.9720874

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper investigates the tax revenue manipulation in China by local taxation administrations to achieve a sustainable performance. We document a higher volatility in the effective corporate income tax rates for those companies registering in provinces with more tax sources caused by the manipulation. We also find that companies' ability to pay tax is negatively correlated with the probability of being selected by local taxation administrations for the purpose of tax revenue manipulation. Second, local taxation administrations' relationships with companies and the subsidy allocated to companies have no significant effect on this selection.

引用

页码：61 / 75

页数：15

共 17 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1986, ACCOUNT REV

[2]

Chen X., 2003, Chinese tango: Government assisted earnings management

[3]

CHEN X, 2003, TAX RES J, V6, P18

[4] FOREIGN TAX CREDIT LIMITATIONS AND PREFERRED STOCK ISSUANCES [J].

COLLINS, JH ;

SHACKELFORD, DA .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1992, 30 :103-124

[5]

Dalgic E., 2006, European Journal of Political Economy, V22, P115

[6]

Frye T, 1997, AM ECON REV, V87, P354

[7]

Gupta S., 1997, J ACCOUNT PUBLIC POL, V16, P1, DOI [10.1016/s0278-4254(96)00055-5, DOI 10.1016/S0278-4254(96)00055-5, 10.1016/S0278-4254(96)00055-5]

[8]

Klassen KJ, 1997, ACCOUNT REV, V72, P455

[9]

SIEGFRIED JJ, 1972, THESIS U WISCONSIN U

[10] EFFECTIVE CORPORATE-TAX RATES - THE EFFECT OF SIZE, CAPITAL INTENSITY, LEVERAGE, AND OTHER FACTORS [J].

STICKNEY, CP ;

MCGEE, VE .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1982, 1 (02) :125-152

← 1 2 →