The dynamic relationship between CEO duality and firm performance: The moderating role of board independence

被引：232

作者：

Duru, Augustine ^{[1
]}

Iyengar, Raghavan J. ^{[2
]}

Zampelli, Ernest M. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Amer Univ, Kogod Sch Business, 4400 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20016 USA

[2] North Carolina Cent Univ, Sch Business, 204 Willis Commerce Bldg,1801 Fayetteville St, Durham, NC 27707 USA

[3] Catholic Univ Amer, Sch Business & Econ, 620 Michigan Ave NE, Washington, DC 20064 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS RESEARCH | 2016年 / 69卷 / 10期

关键词：

CEO duality; Leadership structure; Firm performance; Dynamic endogeneity; Board independence; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; DIRECTORS; AGENCY; MANAGEMENT; OWNERSHIP; DETERMINANTS; EQUITY; IMPACT; COSTS; GMM;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.04.001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

For a panel of U.S. firms, we employ system GMM to estimate a dynamic model of the relationship between firm performance and governance characteristics including board leadership structure. Our results provide convincing evidence that a joint leadership structure, i.e., CEO duality has statistically significant negative impacts on firm performance. We also document that this effect is positively moderated by board independence. The results are robust across a number of sensitivity tests. The findings are consistent with arguments advanced by both agency theorists and some management scholars that though duality might reduce firm performance through managerial entrenchment, it can provide benefits to the firm in the presence of board vigilance. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc All rights reserved.

引用

页码：4269 / 4277

页数：9

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