Technology has significantly improved our ability to predict the traits of our offspring. This technology and the knowledge it affords us have enormous implications for bioethics. When we make a decision to bring (or not to bring) a person into existence, and we are concerned with the welfare of the child herself, we are left in the awkward position of comparing existence with nonexistence. This is the basis of the nonidentity problem, a topic that has generated a large amount of philosophical literature. To my knowledge, however, no one has attempted a comprehensive analysis of this literature from a natural law perspective. This paper attempts to begin such an analysis. If what I say is right, we can see how natural law theory helps explain some of our most basic moral thinking in this very perplexing area of normative ethics. This, I hope, will demonstrate just one of the values of natural law theory for bioethics.
机构:
Harvard Law Sch, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Renmin Univ China, Sch Law, Beijing 100872, Peoples R ChinaHarvard Law Sch, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Guo Rui
Baker, John S. Jr Jr
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机构:
Georgetown Univ, Ctr Constitut, Law Ctr, Washington, DC USA
Louisiana State Univ, Law Ctr, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USAHarvard Law Sch, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
机构:
Univ Oslo, Fac Social Sci, Dept Polit Sci, Pontificial Acad Social Sci, N-0317 Oslo, NorwayUniv Oslo, Fac Social Sci, Dept Polit Sci, Pontificial Acad Social Sci, N-0317 Oslo, Norway