Distance Bounding Protocol for Mutual Authentication

被引:23
作者
Yum, Dae Hyun [1 ]
Kim, Jin Seok [1 ]
Hong, Sung Je [1 ]
Lee, Pil Joong [1 ]
机构
[1] POSTECH, Dept Elect & Elect Engn, Pohang 790784, Kyungbuk, South Korea
关键词
Security; mutual authentication; mafia fraud attack; relay attack; distance bounding protocol; CHALLENGES;
D O I
10.1109/TWC.2010.120610.100491
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
A distance bounding protocol enables one party to determine a practical upper bound on the distance to another party. It is an effective countermeasure against mafia fraud attacks (a.k.a. relay attacks) which do not alter messages between users but only relay messages. The main idea of distance bounding protocols is to repeat fast bit exchanges. One party sends a challenge bit and another party answers with a response bit and vice versa. By measuring the round-trip time between the challenge and the response, an upper bound on the distance between users can be calculated. If messages are relayed, the round-trip time increases and thus mafia fraud attacks can be detected. We introduce an efficient distance bounding protocol for mutual authentication. It enjoys a reduced false acceptance rate under mafia fraud attacks and does not require an extra confirmation message after the fast bit exchange phase.
引用
收藏
页码:592 / 601
页数:10
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