Do government formation deadlocks really damage economic growth? Evidence from history's longest period of government formation impasse

被引:7
作者
Albalate, Daniel [1 ,2 ]
Bel, Germa [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Barcelona, Dept Econometr Stat & Appl Econ, Barcelona, Spain
[2] Observ Policy Anal & Evaluat OAP UB, Barcelona, Spain
来源
GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS | 2020年 / 33卷 / 01期
关键词
CABINET FORMATION; QUALITY; INSTITUTIONS; BELGIUM; POLICIES; IMPACT; PERFORMANCE; LESSONS; REGIONS; REDUCE;
D O I
10.1111/gove.12410
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Several countries have experienced lengthy periods of government formation deadlock in recent years, as they have sought to form a new government. This study examines whether government formation deadlocks damage a country's economy. To do so, we analyze the case of Belgium, which took a record 541 days to create a post-election government, following the June 2010 federal elections. Employing the synthetic control method, our results show that the Belgium economy did not suffer an economic toll; on the contrary, gross domestic product per capita growth was higher than would have otherwise been expected. As such, our evidence contradicts frequent claims that long periods of government formation deadlock negatively affect an economy.
引用
收藏
页码:155 / 171
页数:17
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