Does E-Government Improve Government Capacity? Evidence from Tax Compliance Costs, Tax Revenue, and Public Procurement Competitiveness

被引:40
作者
Kochanova, Anna [1 ,2 ]
Hasnain, Zahid [3 ]
Larson, Bradley [4 ]
机构
[1] Cardiff Business Sch, Cardiff, Wales
[2] Max Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, Bonn, Germany
[3] World Bank Grp, Human Resource Management, Washington, DC USA
[4] World Bank, World Dev Report, 1818 H St NW, Washington, DC 20433 USA
关键词
e-government; tax compliance costs; tax revenue; public procurement; corruption; INFORMATION-TECHNOLOGY; STATE CAPACITY; ORGANIZATION; CORRUPTION; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1093/wber/lhx024
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using cross-country data on e-government systems, this paper analyzes whether e-filing of taxes and e-procurement implementation improves the capacity of governments to raise and spend fiscal resources through lowering tax compliance costs, improving tax collection and public procurement competitiveness, and reducing corruption. Adopting e-filing systems reduces tax compliance costs as measured by the time to prepare and pay taxes, the likelihood and frequency of firms being visited by a tax official, and the perception of tax administration as an obstacle to firms' operation and growth. E-filing is also associated with a moderate increase in the income tax revenue to GDP ratio. The results for e-procurement are weaker, with the number of firms securing or attempting to secure a government contract increasing only in countries with higher levels of development and better institutions. There is no strong relationship between e-government and corruption.
引用
收藏
页码:101 / 120
页数:20
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