States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders

被引:208
作者
Staniland, Paul [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Program Int Secur Policy, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
关键词
CIVIL-WAR; AFGHANISTAN; DEMOCRACY; VIOLENCE; REBEL;
D O I
10.1017/S1537592712000655
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Bargains, deals, and tacit understandings between states and insurgents are common in civil wars. This fascinating mix of conflict and cooperation shapes patterns of politics, governance, and violence. Building on recent findings about state formation, I offer a conceptual typology of political orders amidst civil war. Wartime political orders vary according to the distribution of territorial control and the level of cooperation between states and insurgents. Orders range from collusion and shared sovereignty to spheres of influence and tacit coexistence to clashing monopolies and guerrilla disorder. Examples from contemporary South Asian conflicts illustrate these concepts, which are scalable and portable across contexts. Scholars need to think more creatively about the political-military arrangements that emerge and evolve during war. A key policy implication is that there are many ways of forging stability without creating a counterinsurgent Leviathan.
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页码:243 / 264
页数:22
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