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How do overconfident CEOs respond to regulation fair disclosure? Evidence from financial report readability
被引:4
作者:
Bai, Min
[1
]
Li, Shihe
[2
]
Xu, Limin
[2
,4
]
Yu, Chia-Feng
[3
]
机构:
[1] Univ Sci & Technol Beijing, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Adelaide, Adelaide Business Sch, Adelaide, SA, Australia
[3] Xian Jiaotong Liverpool Univ, Int Business Sch Suzhou, Suzhou, Peoples R China
[4] Univ Adelaide, Adelaide Business Sch, 10 Pulteney St, Adelaide, SA 5000, Australia
关键词:
Financial report readability;
Overconfident CEO;
Regulation fair disclosure;
EARNINGS;
MANAGEMENT;
D O I:
10.1016/j.frl.2022.103349
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
This paper examines how overconfident CEOs adjust financial report readability (FRR) in response to Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD). Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that while being associated with lower readability ex ante, overconfident CEOs increase their firms' FRR relatively to non-overconfident peers after the importance of public disclosure grows due to RegFD adoption. We also find that the relative increase in readability is dependent on the extent of firms' financial constraints and financing through the equity market. Overall, our results suggest that overconfident CEOs fine-tune FRR to reduce the external equity financing cost, especially when selective disclosure and communication are restricted.
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页数:7
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