The Impact of Political Connection and Information Asymmetry on Investment Efficiency: Evidence from China

被引:11
作者
Yu, Hui-Fun [1 ]
Lin, Tsui-Jung [1 ]
Chang, Hai-Yen [1 ]
Wang, Yu-Huai [1 ]
机构
[1] Chinese Culture Univ, Dept Banking & Finance, Taipei 11114, Taiwan
关键词
political connection; information asymmetry; investment efficiency; China; FREE CASH FLOW; CORPORATE-FINANCE; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; FIRMS; INCENTIVES; CORRUPTION; GOVERNANCE; RISK;
D O I
10.3390/su12145607
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
This study investigates the impact of political connection and information asymmetry on the investment efficiency of firms in China. This paper employs a panel data regression analysis on a dataset comprising 4307 observations for listed companies from 2008 to 2015. The results indicate that if taken alone, neither political connection nor information asymmetry affects firms' investment efficiency. However, the interactive effect of both political connection and information asymmetry significantly reduces firms' investment efficiency. The results of this study help investors understand the forces that lead the Chinese firms to deviate from optimal investment decisions.
引用
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页数:15
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