Ownership structure, board of directors and firm performance: evidence from Taiwan

被引:175
作者
Kao, Mao-Feng [1 ]
Hodgkinson, Lynn [2 ]
Jaafar, Aziz [2 ]
机构
[1] Natl Dong Hwa Univ, Dept Accounting, Hualien, Taiwan
[2] Bangor Univ, Bangor Business Sch, Bangor, Gwynedd, Wales
来源
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS IN SOCIETY | 2019年 / 19卷 / 01期
关键词
Firm performance; Board of directors; Ownership; FREE CASH FLOW; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FAMILY OWNERSHIP; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; FOREIGN OWNERSHIP; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; AGENCY PROBLEMS; SIZE; DETERMINANTS;
D O I
10.1108/CG-04-2018-0144
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Purpose Using a data set of listed firms domiciled in Taiwan, this paper aims to empirically assess the effects of ownership structure and board of directors on firm value. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms from 1997 to 2015, this study uses a panel estimation to exploit both the cross-section and time-series nature of the data. Furthermore, two stage least squares (2SLS) regression model is used as robustness test to mitigate the endogeneity issue. Findings The main results show that the higher the proportion of independent directors, the smaller the board size, together with a two-tier board system and no chief executive officer duality, the stronger the firm's performance. With respect to ownership structure, block-holders' ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and family ownership are all positively related to firm value.
引用
收藏
页码:189 / 216
页数:28
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