Advisors to Elites Untangling Their Effect

被引:4
作者
Benesh, Sara C. [1 ]
Armstrong, David A., II [2 ]
Wallander, Zachary [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI 53201 USA
[2] Western Univ, London, ON, Canada
[3] Northwestern Mutual, Milwaukee, WI USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
SUPREME-COURT; LAW-CLERKS; AGGRESSIVE GRANTS; INFORMATION; STRATEGIES; ADVICE; MODEL; CUES;
D O I
10.1086/704740
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
Because decision making is complicated, political elites seek advice when making decisions, and the ways in which they use that advice has systematic features. But, analyses of decision making among elites usually fail to account for advice. We take advantage of unique information about the advice provided to one set of elites to empirically uncover the effect of advice. Specifically, we examine law clerk recommendations on cert to Justice Blackmun. We find that, even after controlling for known determinants of cert and considering sequential decision making, the advice of a trusted advisor matters greatly.
引用
收藏
页码:51 / 73
页数:23
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