Status and incentives

被引:45
作者
Auriol, Emmanuelle [1 ,2 ]
Renault, Regis [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sci Social Toulouse, Toulouse Sch Econ, Toulouse, France
[2] Inst Univ France, Paris, France
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00015.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article introduces status as reflecting an agent's claim to recognition in her work. This is a scarce resource: increasing an agent's status requires that another agent's status be decreased. Higher-status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for money; better-paid agents would exert higher effort in exchange for improved status. The results are consistent with actual management practices: (i) egalitarianism is desirable in a static context; (ii) in a long-term work relationship, juniors' compensation is delayed; and (iii) past performance is rewarded by pay increases along with improved status within the organization's hierarchy.
引用
收藏
页码:305 / 326
页数:22
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