Geographical indication protection in the united states

被引:141
作者
Moschini, Giancarlo [1 ]
Menapace, Luisa [1 ]
Pick, Daniel
机构
[1] Iowa State Univ, Dept Econ, Ames, IA 50011 USA
关键词
competitive industry; free entry; exit; geographical indications; Marshallian stability; quality certification; trademarks; welfare;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01142.x
中图分类号
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要
The economics of geographical indications (GIs) is assessed within a vertical product differentiation framework that is consistent with the competitive structure of agriculture. It is assumed that certification costs are needed for GIs to serve as (collective) credible quality certification devices, and production of high-quality product is endogenously determined. We find that GIs can support a competitive provision of quality and lead to clear welfare gains, although they fall short of delivering the (constrained) first best. The main beneficiaries are consumers. Producers may also accrue some benefit if production of the high-quality products draws on scarce factors that they own.
引用
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页码:794 / 812
页数:19
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