Distributive Politics and Conditional Cash Transfers: The Case of Brazil's Bolsa Familia

被引：47

作者：

Fried, Brian J. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Yale Univ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

来源：

WORLD DEVELOPMENT | 2012年 / 40卷 / 05期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Latin America; Brazil; distributive politics; conditional cash transfers; clientelism; SOCIAL-POLICY; VOTE; SUCCESS; PROTEST; LULA;

D O I：

10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.09.022

中图分类号：

F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];

学科分类号：

0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;

摘要：

Brazilian politicians have long relied on pork and clientelism to win political support, and recent literature suggests that little has changed. However, researchers have yet to systematically investigate whether political criteria influence the distribution of funds through Bolsa Familia. This is especially surprising given the program's prominence in the international community. In this paper, I examine whether political criteria explain the federal government's distribution of Bolsa Familia. I find little evidence that political criteria explain the difference between the number of poor families that live in a municipality and the number of families that receive support. I conclude by discussing the broader significance of this large, programmatic policy to Brazil's political development. (c) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1042 / 1053

页数：12