Taxes and Peer Effects

被引:85
作者
Bird, Andrew [1 ]
Edwards, Alexander [2 ]
Ruchti, Thomas G. [1 ]
机构
[1] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
[2] Univ Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
基金
美国安德鲁·梅隆基金会;
关键词
effective tax rates; peer effects; INCENTIVES; MANAGERS; STYLE; FIRMS; EXECUTIVES; CONTAGION; EARNINGS; CHOICE;
D O I
10.2308/accr-52004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
A growing literature examines how a firm's behavior impacts the behavior of its peers. In this paper, we examine how changes in tax paying, and the associated financial reporting, impact a firm's peers. Changes to tax paying and reporting behavior at other firms within a peer group can be affected by many of the same factors, such as industry-level tax policy changes or audit risk, so we make use of exogenous-to the peer firms-shocks to tax behavior. Following the methodology of Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010), we estimate managerial tax avoidance fixed effects and use these to identify tax rate shocks associated with executive turnover. We find that peer firms respond to these shocks by changing their GAAP tax rates in the same direction. The magnitude of the effect corresponds to an approximately 10 percent response to the average change in peer group GAAP ETR. Our evidence suggests that these peer effects occur only for book (i.e., financial reporting), rather than cash (i.e., real effects), ETR and are concentrated in firms with potentially greater discretion in reporting taxes on foreign earnings.
引用
收藏
页码:97 / 117
页数:21
相关论文
共 41 条
[1]   Peer firms in relative performance evaluation [J].
Albuquerque, Ana .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2009, 48 (01) :69-89
[2]   Peer choice in CEO compensation [J].
Albuquerque, Ana M. ;
De Franco, Gus ;
Verdi, Rodrigo S. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2013, 108 (01) :160-181
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2014, Working Paper
[4]   The incentives for tax planning [J].
Armstrong, Christopher S. ;
Blouin, Jennifer L. ;
Larcker, David F. .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2012, 53 (1-2) :391-411
[5]   Using disclosure to influence herd behavior and alter competition [J].
Arya, A ;
Mittendorf, B .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2005, 40 (1-3) :231-246
[6]   What's My Style? The Influence of Top Managers on Voluntary Corporate Financial Disclosure [J].
Bamber, Linda Smith ;
Jiang, John ;
Wang, Isabel Yanyan .
ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2010, 85 (04) :1131-1162
[7]   The spillover effect of fraudulent financial reporting on peer firms' investments [J].
Beatty, Anne ;
Liao, Scott ;
Yu, Jeff Jiewei .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2013, 55 (2-3) :183-205
[8]   Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies [J].
Bertrand, M ;
Schoar, A .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2003, 118 (04) :1169-1208
[9]   Network Ties Among Low-Tax Firms [J].
Brown, Jennifer L. ;
Drake, Katharine D. .
ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2014, 89 (02) :483-510
[10]   The Spread of Aggressive Corporate Tax Reporting: A Detailed Examination of the Corporate-Owned Life Insurance Shelter [J].
Brown, Jennifer L. .
ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2011, 86 (01) :23-57