The size of venture capital and private equity fund portfolios

被引：53

作者：

Bernile, Gennaro ^{[1
]}

Cumming, Douglas

Lyandres, Evgeny

机构：

[1] Univ Miami, Sch Business Adm, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA

[2] York Univ, Schulich Sch Business, N York, ON M3J 1P3, Canada

[3] Rice Univ, Jesse H Jones Grad Sch Management, Houston, TX 77005 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2007年 / 13卷 / 04期

关键词：

venture capital; private equity; fund portfolio;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.04.004

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We propose a model that examines the optimal size of venture capital and private equity fund portfolios. The relationship between a VC and entrepreneurs is characterized by double-sided moral hazard, which causes the VC to trade off larger portfolios against lower values of portfolio companies. We analyze the structural relations between the VC's optimal portfolio structure and entrepreneurs' and VC's productivities, their disutilities of effort, the value of a successful project, and the required initial investment in a venture. We also test the model's predictions using a small proprietary dataset collected through a survey targeted to VC and private equity funds worldwide. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：564 / 590

页数：27

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