A case for incomplete markets

被引：12

作者：

Blume, Lawrence E. ^{[1
]}

Cogley, Timothy ^{[2
]}

Easley, David A. ^{[1
]}

Sargent, Thomas J. ^{[2
,3
]}

Tsyrennikov, Viktor ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Cornell Univ, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA

[2] NYU, New York, NY 10003 USA

[3] Hoover Inst War Revolut & Peace, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[4] Promontory, Stanford, CA USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2018年 / 178卷

关键词：

Social welfare; Heterogeneous beliefs; Spurious unanimity; Speculation; Incomplete markets; Financial regulation;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

If two rational agents want to trade and there are no externalities, then trade is Pareto improving. Economists generally oppose restrictions on such trade. Complete markets allocations are Pareto optimal and thus complete markets are generally viewed as good. But when individuals want to trade because of heterogeneous beliefs, this standard argument is less compelling. We illustrate this in a standard general equilibrium setting and explore potential social benefits from restrictions on trade that make markets incomplete. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：191 / 221

页数：31

共 13 条

[1] If you're so smart, why aren't you rich? -: Belief selection in complete and incomplete markets [J].