Strategic revelation of differences in segment earnings growth

被引：19

作者：

Wang, Qian ^{[1
]}

Ettredge, Michael ^{[2
]}

Huang, Ying ^{[3
]}

Sun, Lili ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Iowa State Univ, Dept Accounting, Ames, IA 50011 USA

[2] Univ Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045 USA

[3] Univ Louisville, Sch Accountancy, Louisville, KY 40292 USA

[4] Univ N Texas, Dept Accounting, Denton, TX 76203 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND PUBLIC POLICY | 2011年 / 30卷 / 04期

关键词：

SFAS NO. 131; AGENCY COSTS; CASH FLOW; INFORMATION; DISCLOSURE; INVESTMENT;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2011.05.001

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Prior studies have theoretically and empirically documented that incentives to disclose information involve a trade-off between the benefits to the corporation of reducing information asymmetry and the costs of revealing proprietary information. This study investigates the interplay of managers' motives to conceal versus reveal cross-segment differences in earnings growth in multi-segment firms. We find that revealed segment earnings growth differences are negatively associated with proxies for proprietary costs and agency costs, and positively associated with firms' reliance on external financing. We also find that SFAS No. 131 improved the quality of segment information by requiring or allowing revelation of greater cross-segment differences in earnings growth. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：383 / 392

页数：10

共 38 条

[1] THE ROLE OF EARNINGS LEVELS IN ANNUAL EARNINGS RETURNS STUDIES [J].