Impact of manufacturer and retailer's market pricing power on customer satisfaction incentives in supply chains

被引:12
作者
Wang, Charles X. [1 ]
Qian, Zhuang [2 ]
Zhao, Yabing [3 ]
机构
[1] SUNY Buffalo, Sch Management, Buffalo, NY 14260 USA
[2] Penn State Univ, Project & Supply Chain Management Program, Scranton Campus, Dunmore, PA 18512 USA
[3] San Francisco State Univ, Coll Business, 1600 Holloway Ave, San Francisco, CA 94132 USA
关键词
Supply chain; Channel of distribution; Customer satisfaction incentives; Market pricing power; Game theory; CHANNEL COORDINATION; QUALITY IMPROVEMENT; CONTRACTS; PROMOTIONS; STRATEGY; PROFITS; SUPPORT; POLICY;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.08.034
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
Many manufacturers are offering some form of supply chain incentives to motivate their retailers to increase customer satisfaction (CS). In this paper, we focus on the manufacturer's two main CS incentives for the retailer: customer satisfaction index bonus (CSI bonus) and customer satisfaction assistance (CS assistance). When both manufacturer and retailer have strong market pricing power, prior research has shown that the manufacturer should offer both CSI bonus and CS assistance to the retailer. In contrast with prior research results, we find if the manufacturer has weak market pricing power, then she should only offer CS assistance but not CSI bonus to the retailer when the market wholesale price is relatively low. We also quantify the value of the CS incentive programs to the manufacturer's performance improvement in different supply chain settings. In general, we find the manufacturer's CS incentive program is more valuable when demand is more sensitive to the retailer's CS effort. Finally, we obtain additional insights from a few supply chain model extensions.
引用
收藏
页码:98 / 112
页数:15
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