Political connections, entry barriers, and firm performance

被引:28
作者
Chen, Ying [1 ]
Luo, Danglun [2 ]
Li, Weiwen [3 ]
机构
[1] Shenzhen Univ, Coll Econ, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
[2] Sun Yat Sen Univ, Lingnan Coll, Guangzhou 510275, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[3] Sun Yat Sen Univ, Sun Yat Sen Business Sch, Guangzhou 510275, Guangdong, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Political connections; Firm performance; Entry barriers; CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION; ENVIRONMENTS; STRATEGIES; MANAGEMENT; SCOPE;
D O I
10.1108/CMS-08-2013-0148
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to propose, by drawing on the resource-based view (RBV) and economic regulation theory, that companies with political connections are more likely to enter into industries with high entry barriers, as they are more likely to obtain entry permits from the government and can gain more benefits after entering these industries. Managers' political connections are a crucial determinant of firm scope. Although the existing research on this topic has shown that firms tend to use political connections to increase their scope, it remains unclear which industries companies with political connections choose to enter. Drawing on the resource-based view and economic regulation theory, we propose that companies with political connections are more likely to enter into industries with high entry barriers, as they are more likely to obtain entry permits from the government and can gain more benefits after entering these industries. Design/methodology/approach - Data on a sample of Chinese listed privately owned enterprises were used and the findings support the main predictions. Findings - The findings support the main predictions. Originality/value - The research findings of this study contribute to the existing research on political connections and strategic choices.
引用
收藏
页码:473 / 486
页数:14
相关论文
共 32 条
[1]  
Bain J., 1956, BARRIERS TO NEW COMP
[3]  
Chen B., 2008, THE SECURITIES MARKE
[4]   The regulation of entry [J].
Djankov, S ;
La Porta, R ;
Lopez-De-Silanes, F ;
Shleifer, A .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2002, 117 (01) :1-37
[5]   Politically connected firms [J].
Faccio, M .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2006, 96 (01) :369-386
[6]   Political connections and corporate bailouts [J].
Faccio, Mara ;
Masulis, Ronald W. ;
McConnell, John J. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2006, 61 (06) :2597-2635
[7]  
Fan G., 2009, NERI INDEX OF MARKET
[8]   Estimating the value of political connections [J].
Fisman, R .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2001, 91 (04) :1095-1102
[9]  
Fligstein N., 1990, THE TRANSFORMATION O
[10]   MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL-CHANGE - A NOTE ON THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY [J].
GRIMM, CM ;
SMITH, KG .
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 1991, 12 (07) :557-562