Are there monitoring benefits to institutional ownership? Evidence from seasoned equity offerings

被引:81
作者
Demiralp, Ilhan [2 ]
D'Mello, Ranjan [3 ]
Schlingemann, Frederik P. [1 ,4 ]
Subramaniam, Venkat [5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Pittsburgh, Katz Grad Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA
[2] Univ New Orleans, Coll Business Adm, New Orleans, LA 70148 USA
[3] Wayne State Univ, Sch Business Adm, Detroit, MI 48202 USA
[4] Erasmus Univ, Rotterdam Sch Management, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands
[5] Tulane Univ, AB Freeman Sch Business, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA
关键词
Equity offerings; Institutional investors; Agency problems; Monitoring; Information asymmetry; FREE CASH FLOW; OPERATING PERFORMANCE; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; EMPIRICAL POWER; STOCK RETURNS; AGENCY COSTS; INVESTMENT; INVESTORS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.07.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We provide new evidence on the monitoring benefits from institutional ownership by analyzing the impact of institutional ownership on stock price and operating performance following seasoned equity offerings, a setting where the effects of monitoring are likely to be especially important. We find that announcement returns are positively and significantly related to total and active institutional ownership levels and concentration. Post-issue stock returns are positively and significantly related to the contemporaneous post-issue changes in total and active institutional ownership and the concentration of their shareholdings. Operating performance improvements are also related to institutional monitoring in the one, two, and three years following the equity issue. Our results continue to hold even after accounting for the possibility that institutional investors have an informational advantage that enables them to identify and invest in subsequently better performing firms. We also empirically eliminate the possibility that our findings are driven by institutions buying past winners and selling past losers as a way to window-dress their portfolio holdings. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1340 / 1359
页数:20
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