The objective of this study is to analyze whether executive compensation influences the operational cash flow of Brazilian companies listed on B3. A total of 84 companies were analyzed between 2012 and 2015. In the analysis, a multiple linear regression with panel data was performed, in addition to the descriptive statistics. As a dependent variable, the net cash flow from operating activities was adopted and, as independent variables, the fixed compensation, variable and payment based on shares of the board of directors and the fixed compensation of the fiscal council. In the study, the Pearson correlation test was used to identify collinearity between the study variables. As a theoretical basis, the cash flow statement was analyzed, in which the cash flow from operating activities, investment and financing were discussed. Executive Compensation was also discussed, such as fixed and variable compensation of the board of directors, stock-based payment and stock options, fixed compensation of the supervisory board, agency theory and previous studies on the subject. The results show that there is no significant relationship between the executives 'compensation and the companies' operating cash flow, except for the fixed remuneration of the fiscal council, which was positive and significant