Water Allocation in Transboundary River Basins under Water Scarcity: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach

被引:90
作者
Degefu, Dagmawi Mulugeta [1 ]
He, Weijun [1 ,2 ]
Yuan, Liang [3 ]
Zhao, Jian Hua [2 ]
机构
[1] China Three Gorges Univ, Coll Hydraul & Environm Engn, Yichang, Peoples R China
[2] China Three Gorges Univ, Coll Econ & Management, Yichang, Peoples R China
[3] Hohai Univ, Sch Business, Nanjing, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
关键词
Transboundary river basin; Asymmetric Nash bargaining; Nile river basin; Water scarcity; CONFLICT-RESOLUTION; BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM; RULES;
D O I
10.1007/s11269-016-1431-6
中图分类号
TU [建筑科学];
学科分类号
0813 ;
摘要
Transboundary river basins are one of the main sources of fresh water which are facing water scarcity. When transboundary water is contested not only the allocation outcomes matter but also the allocation process should possess a certain desirable properties such as flexibility and sustainability. Therefore designing a mechanism that possesses these desirable characteristics and allocates the contested water resource is important as well. This article proposed a water allocation framework by combining the bankruptcy theory with asymmetric Nash bargaining solution concept for solving the water sharing problem in transboundary river basins under scarcity. Furthermore, the allocation framework was applied to the Nile river basin and to a hypothetical water scarce transboundary river basin. The results obtained were then compared with the allocation outcomes from classical bankruptcy allocation rules. The results showed that the proposed method can provide insights which could be useful for obtaining water allocation outcomes which are easier to implement and enforce under water scarce conditions.
引用
收藏
页码:4451 / 4466
页数:16
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