Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes

被引：3

作者：

Holler, M ^{[1
]}

Skott, P

机构：

[1] Univ Hamburg, Dept Econ, Hamburg, Germany

[2] Univ Massachusetts, Dept Econ, Amherst, MA 01003 USA

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 2005年 / 125卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

Theoretic Model; Important Determinant; Public Finance; Election Outcome; Simple Game;

D O I：

10.1007/s11127-005-3417-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Framing effects and bounded rationality imply that election campaigns may be an important determinant of election outcomes. This paper uses a two-party setting and simple game theoretic models to analyse the strategic interaction between the parties' campaign decisions. Alternations of power emerge naturally, even if both electoral preferences and party positions remain constant.

引用

页码：215 / 228

页数：14

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