True2F: Backdoor-resistant authentication tokens

被引：19

作者：

Dauterman, Emma ^{[1
,2
]}

Corrigan-Gibbs, Henry ^{[1
]}

Mazieres, David ^{[1
]}

Boneh, Dan ^{[1
]}

Rizzo, Dominic ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Stanford, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[2] Google, Mountain View, CA 94043 USA

来源：

2019 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY (SP 2019) | 2019年

关键词：

D O I：

10.1109/SP.2019.00048

中图分类号：

TP301 [理论、方法];

学科分类号：

081202 ;

摘要：

We present True2F, a system for second-factor authentication that provides the benefits of conventional authentication tokens in the face of phishing and software compromise, while also providing strong protection against token faults and back-doors. To do so, we develop new lightweight two-party protocols for generating cryptographic keys and ECDSA signatures, and we implement new privacy defenses to prevent cross-origin token-fingerprinting attacks. To facilitate real-world deployment, our system is backwards-compatible with today's U2F-enabled web services and runs on commodity hardware tokens after a firmware modification. A True2F-protected authentication takes just 57ms to complete on the token, compared with 23ms for unprotected U2F.

引用

页码：398 / 416

页数：19