A comment on Aumann's Bayesian view

被引：59

作者：

Gul, F ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2999578

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：923 / 927

页数：5

共 7 条

[1] EPISTEMIC CONDITIONS FOR NASH EQUILIBRIUM [J].

AUMANN, R ;

BRANDENBURGER, A .

[2] Common priors: A reply to Gul [J].

Aumann, RJ .

[3] CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM AS AN EXPRESSION OF BAYESIAN RATIONALITY [J].

AUMANN, RJ .

[4] HIERARCHIES OF BELIEFS AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE [J].

BRANDENBURGER, A ;

DEKEL, E .

[5]

MERTENS JF, 1985, INT J GAME THEORY, V19, P1

[6]

MORRIS S, 1995, ECON PHILOS, V11, P1

[7]

Savage Leonard., 1954, FDN STAT