Advantageous Selection in Crop Insurance: Theory and Evidence

被引:12
|
作者
He, Juan [1 ]
Rejesus, Roderick [2 ]
Zheng, Xiaoyong [2 ]
Yorobe, Jose, Jr. [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Huazhong Agr Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Wuhan, Hubei, Peoples R China
[2] North Carolina State Univ, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, Raleigh, NC USA
[3] IRRI, Social Sci Div, Laguna, Philippines
[4] Univ Philippines, Laguna, Philippines
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Advantageous selection; crop insurance; ADVERSE SELECTION; MORAL HAZARD; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; INDEX INSURANCE; YIELD RISK; DEMAND; AGGREGATION;
D O I
10.1111/1477-9552.12267
中图分类号
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要
We extend the recently proposed multi-dimensional asymmetric information model to show that advantageous selection could be present in crop insurance with two types of coverage: (i) multiple perils (e.g. a multi-peril, all risk' policy), and (ii) a specific named peril (or set of perils). Our theoretical model suggests that certain characteristics of an insured farmer (or farm) under both types of coverage can be sources of advantageous selection. Farmers who advantageously select are more likely to purchase insurance coverage and less likely to realise a loss. A supplementary empirical analysis, based on data from the Philippine crop insurance market, illustrates how sources of advantageous selection can be identified econometrically.
引用
收藏
页码:646 / 668
页数:23
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