Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games

被引：84

作者：

Croson, R

Fatas, E

Neugebauer, T

机构：

[1] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

[2] Univ Valencia, Valencia 46022, Spain

[3] Leibniz Univ Hannover, Lehrstuhl Finanzmarkttheorie, Hannover, Germany

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2005年 / 87卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

experimental economics; public goods; voluntary contribution mechanism; weakest link mechanism;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：95 / 101

页数：7

共 18 条

[1]

ANDREONI J, 1995, AM ECON REV, V85, P891

[2] WHY FREE RIDE - STRATEGIES AND LEARNING IN PUBLIC-GOODS EXPERIMENTS [J].