Experimental Evidence on Iterated Reasoning in Games

被引:1
作者
Grehl, Sascha [1 ]
Tutic, Andreas [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Leipzig, Inst Sociol, D-04109 Leipzig, Germany
来源
PLOS ONE | 2015年 / 10卷 / 08期
关键词
DECISION-MAKING; PLAYERS MODELS; EQUILIBRIUM; INDUCTION; BELIEFS;
D O I
10.1371/journal.pone.0136524
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
We present experimental evidence on two forms of iterated reasoning in games, i.e. backward induction and interactive knowledge. Besides reliable estimates of the cognitive skills of the subjects, our design allows us to disentangle two possible explanations for the observed limits in performed iterated reasoning: Restrictions in subjects' cognitive abilities and their beliefs concerning the rationality of co-players. In comparison to previous literature, our estimates regarding subjects' skills in iterated reasoning are quite pessimistic. Also, we find that beliefs concerning the rationality of co-players are completely irrelevant in explaining the observed limited amount of iterated reasoning in the dirty faces game. In addition, it is demonstrated that skills in backward induction are a solid predictor for skills in iterated knowledge, which points to some generalized ability of the subjects in iterated reasoning.
引用
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页数:19
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