Informality and lead firm dominance in the sub-contracting chain: The case of Tanzanian trucking firms

被引:4
作者
Sial, Farwa [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Manchester, Global Dev Inst, Manchester, Lancs, England
关键词
Global value chains; Sub-contracting; Firms; Economic geography; GLOBAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS; REGIONAL-DEVELOPMENT; SOUTH-KOREA; POWER; INDUSTRY; SECTOR; EMBEDDEDNESS; GOVERNANCE; DYNAMICS; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1016/j.geoforum.2020.03.011
中图分类号
P9 [自然地理学]; K9 [地理];
学科分类号
0705 ; 070501 ;
摘要
This article makes the case for broadening the analysis on power relations in value chains by focusing on the structure and nature of domestic sub-contracting in Tanzania's road transport trucking sector. Using the framework of Organisational Geographies of Power I identify the rise of Tanzania's lead trucking companies and the sources of their on-going dominance in the sub-contracting chain. Building on critical literature which has theorised subcontracting relations as 'rentief in developed countries, I highlight the role of informality as a source of economic rents in developing countries. Tanzania's trucking industry is a site of intertwining formal and informal capital accumulation. Sub-contracting relations accentuate the political and economic power of lead firms in instrumentalising informality and strengthen their dominance in the road transport sector.
引用
收藏
页码:105 / 115
页数:11
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